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PROCESS, OUTCOMES AND THE INVENTION OF
TRADITION: THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF
THE APPEARANCE OF JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY
Anne Richardson Oakes* and Haydn Davies**
INTRODUCTION
Legitimacy, it has been asserted, is "the belief that
authorities, institutions, and social arrangements are
appropriate, proper, and just."' According to this view,
legitimacy and institutional credibility go hand in hand.
Unpopular rulings or decisions which attract widespread
hostility can be accepted by citizens who recognize the
legitimacy of the institutions that hand them down.
Empirical studies that locate the issue of legitimacy at the
heart of the law's authority stress the role of fair institutional
procedures in fostering internalized compliance, but in this
respect what seems to be important is the role of appearance;
citizens' acceptance of institutional legitimacy depends in
large measure on the extent to which the procedures of the
institution or decision-making body are perceived to be
procedurally fair.2
In the United States, it is axiomatic that the due process
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces a
commitment to fair trial procedures-"a fair trial in a fair
tribunal."' In similar fashion, Article 10 of the Universal
* Ph. D.; Senior Lecturer, Law School, Birmingham City University.
** Ph. D.; Senior Academic, Law School, Birmingham City University.
1. Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and
Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 376 (2006).
2. ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (Princeton University Press
2006) [hereinafter TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW]. See also Tom R. Tyler,
Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and
Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Authorities?, 19 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 215, 233 (2001) (finding that the public's evaluations of the police and
courts are linked primarily to whether individuals perceive these systems to be
procedurally fair).
3. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
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Declaration of Human Rights and Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights purport to guarantee "a fair
and public hearing . . . by an independent and impartial
tribunal,"4 but, as this paper argues, the relationship of
appearances to fairness in these formulations is not well
understood.'
In the United States, the issue has recently presented
itself in the context of judicial elections and the question of
whether contributions to the campaign expenses of a state
judge, by a party to proceedings in which the judge
subsequently participated, compromised the judge's
neutrality.' Here, the fear that appearances may undermine
the due process commitment even where no irregularity in
fact exists underpins the Supreme Court majority ruling that
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence incorporates an
"objective standard" whereby issues of judicial bias are to be
determined not by a search for actual bias but by reference to
appearances.' The court, must ask whether "under a realistic
appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness"
there is "such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the
practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is
to be adequately implemented."
The ruling appears to bring U.S. due process
jurisprudence into line with that of other jurisdictions. In R.
v. Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy, Lord Hewart C.J.
famously asserted that it "is of fundamental importance that
justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and
undoubtedly be seen to be done."' From this position, the
European Court of Human Rights now also claims to
determine issues of judicial neutrality by reference to the
existence of a "doctrine of appearances"; but as the dissent in
4. European Convention on Human Rights art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221.
5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights Art. X, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948); European
Convention on Human Rights art. 6, supra note 4.
6. E.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
7. Id. at 2263. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788-
90 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Even if judges were able to refrain from
favoring donors, the mere possibility that judges' decisions may be motivated by
the desire to repay campaign contributors is likely to undermine the public's
confidence in the judiciary.").
8. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
9. R v. Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy, (1924) 1 K.B. 256, 259.
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Kress v. France has pointed out, "case-law which places too
much emphasis on appearances" can operate "to the
detriment of respectable national traditions and . . . litigants'
real interests."'" The context here has primarily been that of
the role of court officials but the implications have found their
effect in the modification of U.K. court practice and delayed
the implementation of reforms designed to enhance the
efficiency of domestic civil procedure." Specifically, the role
of legal advisors has been called into question, while the
extended use of assessors as judicial assistants-envisaged by
Lord Woolf as a means of enhancing the quality of judicial
outputs-has been stillborn.12
The "appearance of bias" jurisprudence of both the U.S.
Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights
draws on formulations of due process which are said to derive
from, or be inherent in, the English common law tradition but
as historian Eric Hobsbawm has explained, traditions which
appear or claim to be old or well established may on closer
inspection turn out otherwise.'" As he points out, the
ceremonial pageantry of the modern British monarchy draws
on a rhetoric of traditional practices rooted in an
"immemorial past," but these are largely nineteenth and
twentieth century developments, and the claimed tradition is
in the main fictitious.' 4 Hobsbawm describes the term
"invented tradition" as:
a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly
10. Kress v. France, App. No. 39594/98, 2001 Eur. Ct H.R. 1, 34 13 (Joint
Partly Dissenting Opinion) (unreported).
11. See Bow Spring v. Manzanillo II, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1007, [57]-[651,
(2005) 1 W.L.R. 144 (followed in Global Mariner v. Atlantic Crusader, [2005]
EWHC (Admlty) 380, [111-[17], (2005) 2 All E.R. (Comm) 389). The U.K. Court
of Appeals took the view that such changes were necessary to bring U.K
procedure into line with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights. See Deirdre Dwyer, The Future of Assessors Under the CPR, 25 CIV.
JUST. Q. 219, 225-29 (2006) [hereinafter Dwyer, Assessors]; Deirdre Dwyer, The
Effective Management of Bias in Civil Expert Evidence, 26 CIV. JUST. Q. 57
(2007) [hereinafter Dwyer, Effective Management].
12. See Mort v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44564/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2001)
(unreported); Clark v. Kelly (2004) 1 A.C. 681; Dwyer, Effective Management,
supra note 11, at 63. U.K. courts are required to give effect to the provisions of
the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence by virtue of S2 Human
Rights Act 1998.
13. Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION
OF TRADITION 1 (Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger eds., 1983).
14. Id.
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accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which
seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by
repetition, which automatically implies continuity with
the past."
It is their "peculiarity," however, that this continuity is
largely "factitious." " [TIhey are responses to novel
situations which take the form of reference to old situations,
or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory
repetition.""
In this paper we examine the "doctrine of appearances" in
relation to issues of judicial neutrality as just such an
example of the invention of tradition. We take the view that
while the doctrine is said to rest upon well-established
tradition, in terms of its current operation it is in fact a new
arrival with a disruptive potential. We locate the
development in the context of a growing concern with the
importance of procedural transparency in public life and
suggest that this is a particular manifestation of late
twentieth and early twenty-first century concern with the loss
of public confidence in the institutions and operating
principles of government.
In her Reith lectures, the philosopher Baroness Onora
O'Neill has suggested that talk of a "crisis of trust" in public
life is more accurately formulated in terms of a "culture of
suspicion" and that the underlying concern may be directed
towards the reliability of outcomes." "[C]laims about a crisis
of trust," she suggests "are mainly evidence of an unrealistic
hankering for a world in which safety and compliance are
total, and breaches of trust are eliminated."" The emerging
consensus that we detect on both sides of the Atlantic
concerning the importance of appearance as a fundamental
aspect of fair procedure rests upon acceptance of the link
between legitimacy and public confidence. In the formulation
of the European Court of Human Rights, "[what is at stake is
the confidence which the courts must inspire in the public in
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2.
17. Id.
18. ONORA O'NEILL, A QUESTION OF TRUST: THE BBC REITH LECTURES 2002,
at 18 (2002).
19. Id. at 19.
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a democratic society."20 The underlying assumption is that
procedures have a value which is independent of outcomes
and can be justified on that basis. In Caperton v. Massey, the
U.S. Supreme Court appears to have acceded to this view; but
nowhere is the premise challenged.2 ' As Professor Galligan
suggests, however, the theoretical model underpinning this
assumption pays insufficient attention to the issue of
22accuracy. The empirical research of social science
notwithstanding, to the extent that this purports to show that
procedures generate their own normative framework but
neglects the importance of correct outcomes in shaping the
popular confidence from which legitimacy is said to derive, it
is, he asserts, fundamentally flawed.2 3
This article consists of three main sections. In Section I
we examine the growing importance of appearances as a
determinant of judicial bias by reference to the jurisprudence
of the U.S. Supreme Court and the European Court of Human
Rights and note that, as both the Caperton and Kress dissents
have pointed out, an appearance test is not easy to apply.24
The open invitation of Chief Justice Roberts's parade of the
horribles will undoubtedly ensure that the contours of the
doctrine will be tested at litigants' expense, but our specific
concern in this paper is with the quality (by which we mean
accuracy or reliability) of judicial outcomes.
In this connection, in Section II we take as our example
the use of judicial assistants and advisors the purpose of
which we suppose is to enhance the accuracy of judicial fact-
finding and evaluation and thus the reliability of outcomes.
An appearance test must have implications here. We frame
the issue thus: does the proximity of the relationship between
judge and an advisor-whose function is to assist her in
matters of factual complexity-have the potential to generate
20. Piersack v. Belgium, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 169, 179 (1983).
21. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2264 (2009).
22. D.J. GALLIGAN, DUE PROCESS AND FAIR PROCEDURES: A STUDY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 89-95 (1996).
23. Id. at 94.
24. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Kress v. France,
App. No. 39594/98, Eur. Ct H.R. 1, 32 85 (2001) (Joint Partly Dissenting
Opinion) (unreported).
25. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269-72 (Roberts C.J., dissenting) (outlining
forty possible situations in which a "reasonable suspicion" test would be difficult
or impossible to apply).
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popular suspicion of influence such as to compromise the
appearance of judicial neutrality? Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights now appears to answer:
"yes." Current interpretations seem to require a complete
ban where the advisor does not form part of the decision-
making tribunal.26 This has had a particular impact in the
United Kingdom where courts have been directed to adapt
their procedures accordingly.27
To date, the position in the United States has been
different. Some circuit courts, notably the Ninth Circuit,
have drawn up procedural guidelines to ensure that the
advice given by an advisor to the judge is brought onto the
record and thus made amenable to appellate review.28 In so
doing, they demonstrate some sensitivity to the issue we
raise, but on the whole we detect a reluctance to problematize
these appointments. The general explanation given is that
the technical advisor, like the law clerk, is a member of the
judge's personal staff.2 9 Trial judges possess "inherent power
to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required
for the performance of their duties";"o the advisor thus
appointed becomes part of the machinery of the court and
thus outside the mischief of the "appearance" principle. This
we consider is a pragmatic and outcome-focused approach,
but in a climate of increasing sensitivity to the importance of
transparency in public life we query the extent to which the
analogy with the law clerk can or should be sustained.
We suggest the doctrinal key to the difference lies in the
degree of sensitivity that the reviewing court is prepared to
26. See infra notes 117-36 and accompanying text.
27. See Bow Spring v. Manzanillo II [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1007, [571-[65],
(2005) 1 W.L.R. 144.
28. Techsearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (opining that these guidelines now formed part of Ninth Circuit law
(citing Ass'n of Mexican-American Educators (AMAE) v. California, 231 F.3d
572, 611 (9th Cir. 2000) (Tashima, J., dissenting))). See also Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Enforma Natural Prods., Inc., 362 F.3d 1204, 1214 (9th Cir. 2004)
("We take this opportunity to join a number of courts that have endorsed Judge
Tashima's recommendations."); Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 203 F.
Supp. 2d 27, 31 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that the court had been guided "in
large part by the extremely thoughtful and oft-cited dissent of Judge Tashima
in [AMAE]").
29. See Reilly v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D.R.I. 1988)
(explaining that a non-testifying court advisor becomes in effect "a specialized
law clerk"); cf AMAE, 231 F.3d at 613-14 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
30. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920).
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display to "insider" perspectives when considering the
attributes of the "informed and fair-minded observer."3 We
suggest that whereas both U.S. federal courts and the
European Court formulations manifest a degree of similarity,
we detect in the latter a greater willingness to attach weight
to the perspective of the ordinary man or woman in the street
who is unacquainted with the conventions and norms of
judicial process and for that reason perhaps more willing to
infer bias or impropriety than the reviewing court might be.
This approach implies acquiescence to the assumption that in
determining the respective balance between procedure and
outcomes, priority must go to the former. The effect is to
ignore the extent to which public confidence in judicial
process-upon which legitimacy is said to depend-requires a
similar confidence in the accuracy of the outcomes produced.
It has been suggested that a way to protect the reliability
of outcomes from the unwarranted suspicions of the
uninformed is to be robust about substituting the perspective
of the review court for the lay observer of contemporary
formulation.32 However, this suggestion fails to address the
argument that the courts should not be exempt from
accepting their share of responsibility for engaging in the
process of overcoming the disconnect between appearance and
legitimacy, which continues to exercise the popular
imagination. In this connection we bear in mind Baroness
O'Neill's warnings on the dangers of an excessive desire for
transparency:
Perhaps the culture of accountability that we are
relentlessly building for ourselves actually damages trust
rather than supporting it. Plants don't flourish when we
pull them up too often to check how their roots are
growing: political, institutional and professional life too
may not flourish if we constantly uproot it to demonstrate
that everything is transparent and trustworthy.33
As we say in the vernacular, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it."
If we are satisfied that the use of technical advisors is
sometimes necessary to enhance the quality of judicial
outcomes, then from a pragmatic view, a robust approach
31. See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
32. See Abimbola A. Olowofoyeku, Bias and the Informed Observer: A Call
for a Return to Gough, 68 CAMBRIDGE. L.J. 388, 392 (2009).
33. O'NEILL, supra note 18, at 19.
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may be desirable.
In our final section we revisit the theme of bias in a
culture of suspicion. We are attracted to the view that the
increased concern with appearances which we claim to detect
is largely a function of a loss of confidence in the possibility of
neutrality. The great Jerome Frank sitting as a circuit judge
in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit asserted:
"[diemocracy must, indeed, fail unless our courts try cases
fairly, and there can be no fair trial before a judge lacking in
impartiality and disinterestedness."3 4 This should not,
however, be taken to require complete judicial passivity:
If . . . "bias" and "partiality" be defined to mean the total
absence of preconceptions in the mind of the judge, then
no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will. The
human mind, even at infancy, is no blank piece of paper.3 5
We endorse the distinction between judicial "bias" and
"partiality" or as we prefer to call it "preference" or
"predisposition." The former is impermissible but the latter is
now widely understood to be a normal characteristic of the
human condition." We claim that it is the failure to
differentiate between the two that underpins the current
concern with transparency and now fatally threatens the use
of experts as judicial advisors. As to whether the situation
can now be retrieved, we are pessimistic. As has been
observed: "[plublic confidence in the judicial process and the
administration of justice is based on trust. Once that trust
turns into suspicion, the system of justice begins to
unravel."
34. In re JP Linahan Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1943).
35. Id.
36. "We are born with predispositions; and the process of education, formal
and informal, creates attitudes in all men which affect them in judging
situations, attitudes which precede reasoning in particular instances and which,
therefore, by definition, are pre-judices. Without acquired 'slants,' pre-
conceptions, life could not go on." Id.
37. Abimbola A. Olowofoyeku, Subjective Objectivity: Judicial Impartiality
and Social Intercourse in the U.S. Supreme Court, PUBLIc LAw 15, 17 (2006).
[Vol:51580
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SECTION I: JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY AND THE APPEARANCE OF
BIAS
1. The European Court of Human Rights and a "Doctrine of
Appearances": A Late Twentieth Century Arrival
Although the European Court has never made the direct
claim, the frequent references in its appearance jurisprudence
to the dictum "justice must not only be done; it must also be
seen to be done" indicate an implicit assumption of a
continuity with a tradition that derives from the English
common law.3 8 However, the case of R v. Sussex Justices, Ex
parte McCarthy-from which the dictum derives-was
decided in 1924," and as Justice Scalia has pointed out, there
was no common law requirement of judicial recusal for bias at
the time of Blackstone."0 In the following section we locate
the U.S. Supreme Court's current concern with appearances
in the context of a similar late twentieth century development
in European human rights jurisprudence.
1.1. The European Commission: "equality of arms,"
"external perspectives" and "objective/subjective"
analysis
The so-called "doctrine of appearances" of modern
38. See, e.g., Delcourt v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355, 369 (1970) ("The
preceding considerations are of a certain importance which must not be
underestimated. If one refers to the dictum 'justice must not only be done; it
must also be seen to be done', these considerations may allow doubts to arise
about the satisfactory nature of the system in dispute."). This is the earliest
reference we have found and is not explicit as to its origin. Cf De Cubber v.
Belgium, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 236, 244 (1985).
However, it is not possible for the Court to confine itself to a purely
subjective test; account must also be taken of considerations relating to
the functions exercised and to internal organisation (the objective
approach). In this regard, even appearances may be important; in the
words of the English maxim . . . "justice must not only be done: it must
also be seen to be done" . . . . [Any judge in respect of whom there is a
legitimate reason to fear a lack of impartiality must withdraw. What is
at stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must
inspire in the public . ...
Id. (quoting Delcourt, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 369).
39. R v. Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy, (1924) 1 K.B. 256, 259.
40. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 543-44 (1994). See John P.
Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L. J. 605, 609-10 (1947) (pointing
out that Bracton's attempt to introduce into English law a requirement of
judicial disqualification for bias was displaced by Coke's rule against "interest"
and was absolutely rejected by Blackstone).
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jurisprudence finds its genesis in four early decisions of the
European Human Rights Commission and Committee of
Ministers, which predate the formal law reporting of the
Council of Europe and the creation of the European Human
Rights Reports.4 1 All four cases involved Article 6 challenges
to the procedures of the Austrian criminal courts.42 In Ofner
and Hopfinger, the Commission and Committee considered
the role of the Generalprokurator of the Supreme Court of
Austria and specifically whether the latter's practice of
advising the Court's Rapporteur on a plea of nullity, where
that advice was given and the decision reached in the absence
of the defendant's counsel, contravened the principle of
"equality of arms," said to be "an inherent element of a 'fair
trial"' protected by Article 6.4 In the context of the Austrian
criminal code as a whole, and in the particular circumstances
41. Ofner v. Austria, App. No. 524/59, 1963 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. (Eur.
Comm'n on H.R.) 676; Hopfinger v. Austria, App. No. 617/59, 1963 Y.B. EUR.
CONY. ON H.R. (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) 676; Pataki v. Austria, App. No. 596/59,
1963 Y.B. EUR. CONW. ON H.R. (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.)714; Dunshirn v. Austria,
App. No. 789/60, 1963 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON H.R. (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.)714.
42. The full text of Art. 6 Eur. Conv. on H.R. (right to a fair trial) reads as
follows:
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly by
the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the
interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private
life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would
prejudice the interests ofjustice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following
minimum rights: a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he
understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him; b) to have adequate time and the facilities for the
preparation of his defence; c) to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to
pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice
so require; d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and
to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf
under the same conditions as witnesses against him; e) to have the free
assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the
language used in court.
European Convention on Human Rights art. 6, supra note 4.
43. Ofner, 1963 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. at 692; Hopfinger, 1963 Y.B EUR.
CONV. ON H.R. at 680-688.
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of these cases, the Commission was able to conclude that no
inequality in the position of the parties existed." In Pataki
and Dunshirn, however, Article 6 challenges were sustained
where, on an appeal against sentence and despite the
potential for the outcome to adversely affect the defendants'
position, the Chief Public Prosecutor addressed the court in
private but the defendants themselves were afforded no
opportunity to be heard." Observing that Article 6 did not
define the notion of a fair trial in a criminal case, the
Commission adopted an expansive approach: the article's
provisions were not to be interpreted restrictively and a trial
may fail to meet the required standard of fairness even
though the "minimum rights" guaranteed by paragraphs 3
and 2 have been respected.4 6 Specifically, the Commission
asserted "it is beyond doubt that the wider and general
provision of a fair trial, contained in paragraph (1) of Article
6, embodies the notion 'equality of arms." 47
In these early decisions the basis of the objective and
subjective tests of impartiality or bias which later become the
"doctrine of appearances" is already discernible. In Pataki
and Dunshirn, although the precise term is not used, the
Commission recognized the importance of external
perceptions. Conceding that the absence of any record of the
national court's deliberations would preclude a definitive
decision concerning the Public Prosecutor's actual role, the
fact of his physical presence was crucial; the Commission
could not ignore the potential effect on the public perception:
Even on the assumption . .. that the Public Prosecutor did
not play an active role at this stage of the proceedings, the
very fact that he was present and thereby had an
44. Ofner, 1963 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. at 692; Hopfinger, 1963 Y.B EUR.
CONy. ON H.R. at 680-688.
45. Pataki, 1963 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. 714; Dunshirn, 1963 Y.B. EUR.
CONv. ON H.R. at 731-732. Cf Ofner, 1963 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. at 692;
Hopfinger, 1963 Y.B EUR. CONV. ON H.R. at 680-688.
46. Pataki, 1963 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. 714; Dunshirn, 1963 Y.B. EUR.
CONV. ON H.R. at 730 (citing Nielsen v. Denmark, App. No. 343/57, 1961 Y.B
EUR. CONV. ON H.R. (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) 490-593).
47. Pataki, 1963 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. 714; Dunshirn, 1963 Y.B. EUR.
CONv. ON H.R. at 730. See JOSEPH M. JACOB, CIVIL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (2007) (explaining that the term "equality of arms" is "more
familiar in civilian jurisprudence than in the common law" and is "an omnibus
term embracing a number of separate rights" of a disparate nature arising in
connection with issues of access to the courts and the right to be heard).
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opportunity of influencing the members of the Court,
without the accused or his counsel having any similar
opportunity or any possibility of contesting any
statements made by the Prosecutor, constitutes an
inequality which, in the opinion of the Commission, is
incompatible with the notion of a fair trial.48
In this methodology, objective analysis operates as a fall-
back position. If potential inequality is to be equated with
actual inequality, then despite the absence of evidence of
actual subjective bias on the part of the decision-makers, the
court must err on the side of caution and a declaration of
incompatibility will ensue.
1.2. The modern formulation
Some seven years later, the early Commission decisions
were cited before the European Court of Human Rights in
cases involving Article 6 challenges to the procedures of the
Belgian Court of Cassation.4 9 At issue in Delcourt v. Belgium
(a criminal case) was the role of the Procureur G6n6ral in
Belgium's highest court." The office heads a multilevel
organization whose role and personnel differ between the
lower courts and the Court of Cassation. In the latter, the
representative of the office acts as an advisor to the court in a
manner similar to that of the Advocate General of the
European Court of Justice but with one important difference:
unlike the representative of the Procureur G6ndral, the
Advocate General of the European Court does not retire with
the judges during their deliberations." Clearly reluctant to
be seen as interfering with a long-established national legal
system, the court emphasized that the procedure at issue
"appears never to have been put in question by the legal
profession or public opinion in Belgium,"" and ruled that
because the Procureur G6ndral was not "considered as a
48. Dunshirn, 1963 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. at 732.
49. Article 6(1) does play a part in the earlier decision of Neumeister v.
Austria, but the court decided that article 6(1) was not engaged in requests for
provisional release from incarceration. Neumeister v. Austria, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep.
91, 132 (1968). Elsewhere, Article 6(1) is invoked, though unsuccessfully, in the
context of the timeliness aspect of a fair trial rather than partiality which is
what concerns us here. See id. at 130-31.
50. Delcourt v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355 (1970).
51. Id. at 359-60.
52. Id. at 371.
584 [Vol:51
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party," then vis-A-vis the defendant, the doctrine of "equality
of arms" did not apply."
Nevertheless, noting that the defendants-as persons
outside the legal system-might see the official as an
"adversary" in a way which "insiders" familiar with the
system's practices and norms would not,5 4 the court
continued:
The preceding considerations are of a certain importance
which must not be underestimated. If one refers to the
dictum "justice must not only be done; it must also be seen
to be done," these considerations may allow doubts to arise
about the satisfactory nature of the system in dispute.5 5
The proviso that sufficient objective evidence of
safeguards of the defendants' rights could satisfy the
requirements of Article 6 indicated a reluctance to condemn
the propriety of well-established procedures of national courts
(as opposed to the conduct of individual personnel)," which
has continued to characterize the court's jurisprudence.5 We
return to these issues later.
Piersack v. Belgium, the next important case to come
before the court, concerned the propriety of a judge
participating in an appeal to the Belgian Court of Appeal
when he had previously acted as public prosecutor in the trial
court below." The European Court emphasized that although
the judge's personal integrity was not in issue, the Article 6
requirement could not be purely subjective; "[i]n this area," it
concluded:
even appearances may be of a certain importance .
[Any judge in respect of whom there is a legitimate
reason to fear a lack of impartiality must withdraw. What
is at stake is the confidence which the courts must inspire
in the public in a democratic society. 5
With this formulation, the doctrine has assumed
53. Id. at 368.
54. Id. at 369.
55. Id.
56. Delcourt v. Belgium, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355, 369 (1970) ("Looking behind
appearances, the Court does not find the realities of the situation to be in any
way in conflict with [the Article 6 right].").
57. See Kress v. France, App. No. 39594/98, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1
(unreported).
58. Piersack v. Belgium, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 169, 170-71 (1983).
59. Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
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recognizable shape and the phrases emphasized appear more
or less verbatim in subsequent judgments." By 1993, in
Borgers v. Belgium," the third element of the court's modern
jurisprudence was in place. Commenting that the concept of
a fair trial had undergone considerable evolution, the court,
justifying a new importance to be attached to appearances,
referred to an "increased sensitivity of the public to the fair
administration of justice."6 2 The supporting citations derive
from Piersack to the effect that "[w]hat is at stake is the
confidence which the courts must inspire in the public in a
democratic society,"6 but the Borgers justification goes
further than previous versions in its assertion of an
underlying public concern, which the court must address.'
At no stage did the court provide evidence to substantiate this
claim and indeed, in subsequent cases involving the Belgian,
French or Portuguese "Courts of Cassation" or their
equivalents, the European Court appears to have gone out of
its way to record that the national system under scrutiny
commands considerable respect amongst the public and
profession alike. At this point we continue to record
doctrinal development, but we return to these issues in our
conclusion.
Thus, by the 1990s, the three elements of the court's
jurisprudence: the Delcourt concern with appearance, the
Piersack subjective/objective juxtaposition, and the Borgers
assertion of public sensitivity to which the court must
respond have come together in the modern formulation
which the court now either spells out in full or, as in Kress v.
France, refers to in shorthand form as the court's "doctrine of
appearances," binding on national courts in both criminal and
civil cases although not necessarily in precisely the same
way.66
60. See Belilos v. Switzerland, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. 466, 489 (1988);
Hauschildt v. Austria, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 266, 279 (1988); Sramek v. Austria, 7
Eur. H.R. Rep. 351, 364 (1985); De Cubber v. Belgium, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 236,
244 (1985).
61. Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92 (1993).
62. Id. at 108.
63. Piersack, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 179.
64. Borgers, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 107-08.
65. See Vermeulen v. Belgium, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15, 321 (2001); Kress v.
France, App. No. 39594/98, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (unreported); Lobo Machado v.
Portugal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 79, 89 (1997).
66. Kress, Eur. Ct. H.R. 11 81. Cf Micallef v. Malta, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37,
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2. Appearance Jurisprudence in the U.S. Supreme Court
2.1. Recusal before Caperton
Despite the absence in pre-twentieth century English
common law jurisprudence of a requirement of judicial
recusal for bias, in the United States, federal statutes have
compelled district judges to recuse themselves on the grounds
of interest or prior involvement since 1792. Recusal on the
grounds of generalized bias was not required until 1911."
The current provisions applicable to U.S. judges are found in
Sections 144 and 455(a) of Title 28 of the United States
Code. 9 Section 144 provides a procedure whereby a party
may challenge a district judge on the grounds of "personal
bias or prejudice" by way of affidavit.70 Section 455(a) applies
942 (2010).
According to the Court's constant case law, the existence of impartiality
for the purposes of art. 6(1) must be determined according to a
subjective test where regard must be had to the personal conviction
and behaviour of a particular judge, that is, whether the judge held any
personal prejudice or bias in a given case; and also according to an
objective test, that is to say by ascertaining whether the tribunal itself
and, among other aspects, its composition, offered sufficient guarantees
to exclude any legitimate doubt in respect of its impartiality.
Id.
For the duty of national courts to give effect to the requirements of the duty
in civil and criminal proceedings see Dombo Beheer BV v. The Netherlands, 18
Eur. H.R. Rep. 213, 227 (1993) (asserting that the requirements inherent in the
concept of a "fair hearing" are not necessarily the same in civil and criminal
cases. Contracting States have greater latitude when dealing with civil cases
concerning civil rights and obligations than they have when dealing with
criminal cases).
67. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 543-44 (1994) (recounting the
history of judicial recusal); see also Frank, supra note 40, at 609-12 (discussing
English common law disqualification and concluding "[iun short, English
common law practice at the time of the establishment of the American court
system was simple in the extreme. Judges disqualified for financial interest.
No other disqualifications were permitted, and bias, today the most
controversial ground for disqualification, was rejected entirely."); Peter W.
Bowie, The Last 100 years: An Era of Expanding Appearances, 48 S. TEX. L.
REV. 911 (2007) (outlining the development of attempts to regulate the federal
judiciary).
68. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 533-44. See Frank, supra note 40, at 627.
69. 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455(a) (2006).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 144.
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and
files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the
matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him
or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further
therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
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to all justices, judges, and magistrates and puts the onus on
the particular individual to "disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned."" Section 455 underwent considerable revision
in 1974 designed to bring it into conformity with the recently
adopted ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C (1974) by
replacing a subjective "in his opinion" standard with an
objective test with the aim of improving public confidence in
the judicial system.72 The U.S. Supreme Court considered the
scope of the current provision on two occasions, first in 1988,73
and again in 1994,74 and confirmed that this is indeed an
appearance test: "what matters is not the reality of bias or
prejudice, but its appearance." 5 The perspective is that of a
"reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding
facts and circumstances," but the Court has yet to give
detailed guidance concerning the application of the test in
particular circumstances.
Sections 144 and § 455(a) apply to federal judiciary only.
The position of the state judiciary is usually determined by
reference to state codes and the Due Process clause of the
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that
bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before
the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or
good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A
party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made
in good faith.
Id.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
72. See Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859-60
(1988) ("[Aldvancement of the purpose of the provision [§ 4551 . . . does not
depend upon whether or not the judge actually knew of facts creating an
appearance of impropriety, so long as the public might reasonably believe that
he or she knew." (citing S.Rep. No. 93-419, at 5 (1973); H.R.Rep. No. 93-1453, at
5 (1974))); ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 R. 2.11 (2008).
73. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. 847.
74. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
75. Id. at 548. See also Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860 ("The goal of section
455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality." (quoting Hall v. Small Bus.
Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983))); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S.
238, 242 (1980) (the requirement of judicial neutrality "preserves both the
appearance and reality of fairness, 'generating the feeling, so important to a
popular government, that justice has been done.'" (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
76. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (Rehnquist,
J., statement). See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 861.
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Fourteenth Amendment," but whether the latter
incorporated an appearance test was, prior to Caperton v.
Massey, by no means clear. Caperton concerned the election
of a member of the state judiciary and at a narrow level
represents the Supreme Court's attempt to tackle the
potential of what Justice O'Connor has termed the "judicial
arms race" generated by state judiciary election practices to
undermine public confidence in the judiciary." At a broader
level, Caperton can be located in the context of a developing
emphasis on the importance of the appearances generally
irrespective of whether concerns of impropriety are sustained
by an underlying substance."
2.2. Appearances and the Due Process Clause
The facts of Caperton are, by now, well-known. Newly
elected to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
Justice Benjamin voted-with a 3:2 majority-to overturn a
jury verdict awarding victory to Caperton in his action for
punitive damages against A.T. Massey Coal Company
(Massey), a competitor whose CEO, Don Blankenship, had
made substantial contributions to the judge's election
campaign expenses."1 The contributions exceeded those of the
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1. The ABA's Codes of Judicial Conduct have
been adopted by forty-nine of the states in one form or another. See Leslie W.
Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality
"Might Reasonably Be Questioned," 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55 (2000) ("The
American Bar Association's Codes of Judicial Conduct are the foundation for
judicial discipline and disqualification in American courts.").
78. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). See
Abramson, supra note 77.
79. Sandra Day O'Connor, Fair and Independent Courts, 137 DAEDALUS 8, 9
(Fall 2008).
80. See id. (expressing the view that the absence of a "ceiling for fundraising
in state judicial races" is contributing to a "judicial arms race" undermining
public confidence in the neutrality of judges and indicating that "the level of
anger directed toward judges today exceeds that of the past"); Pamela S.
Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton, 123
HARV. L. REV. 80, 96 (2009) ("[W~e believe that reapportionment is one area in
which appearances do matter." (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647-48
(1993))); id. at 98 n.102 ("[Tihe State's 'interest in protecting public confidence'
as a factor supporting the imposition of voter ID requirements that was
'independent' of any showing that such requirements actually prevented voter
fraud." (quoting Crawford v. Marion County Board of Elections, 128 S. Ct. 1610,
1620 (2008))). The decision in Caperton "involve[d] a complex jurisprudence of
appearance." Id. at 98.
81. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
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rest of Benjamin's donors combined and were three times
greater than the sum spent by Benjamin's own campaign
committee." Justifying at length his refusal to recuse
himself, Justice Benjamin rejected what he termed "apparent
or political justice" in favor of "actual justice" as the
touchstone of judicial propriety." The former was dependent
upon "the manipulation of appearances or the vagaries of
sensationalism," but the latter depended upon "actualities"
and should be measured in terms of "the quality of [the
court's] legal reasoning":'
Through its written decisions, a court gives that
transparency of decision-making needed from
governmental entities. Apparent or political justice is
based instead on appearances and is measured not by the
quality of a court's legal analysis, but rather by the
political acceptability of the case's end-result as measured
by dominant partisan groups such as politicians and the
media, or by the litigants, themselves. Apparent or
political justice is based on half-truths, innuendo,
conjecture, surmise, prejudice and bias. Since all cases
will generally have a winner and a loser, a system based
upon "apparent or political justice" will be the subject of
constant criticism-all partisan, little academic.85
His conclusion that Due Process required recusal "only in
those rare cases wherein a judge or justice has a 'direct,
personal, substantial [or] pecuniary interest' in the outcome
of the case"86 was not accepted by the Supreme Court
majority which opted for an "appearance" test." The
emphasis on "actualities" was not the "proper inquiry."" On
"a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human
weakness" the campaign contributions posed "such a risk of
82. Id.
83. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 286 n.1, 294 (W. Va.
2008).
84. Id. at 285, 286 n.2. Justice Benjamin pointed out that Canon 2A, of the
W. Va. Code of Judicial Conduct, which prohibits judges from engaging in
activities which are improper or which give the appearance of impropriety was
not applicable here. Id. at 293 n.13. His "activities," i.e. running for office, were
perfectly legitimate. Id. at 293. The activities complained of were those of third
parties over whom he had no control. Id.
85. Id. at 294.
86. Id. (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821-22 (1986)).
87. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266 (2009).
88. Id. at 2264.
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actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be
forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately
implemented.""
Chief Justice John Roberts's dissent-in which Justices
Scalia, Thomas and Alito joined-spelled out forty grounds
for potential challenge, but essentially amounted to an attack
on workability; an appearance test, the Chief Justice
asserted, "cannot be defined in any limited way" and
"provides no guidance to judges and litigants about when
recusal will be constitutionally required."o The "probability
of bias" standard articulated by the majority failed "to provide
clear, workable guidance for future cases," and raised far
more questions than it answered.9 The Court's decision, he
predicted, would "inevitably lead to an increase in allegations
that judges are biased, however groundless those charges
may be."92 Justice Scalia, picking up this point, asserted that
far from promoting confidence in the judicial system, an
"appearance test" with its opportunities for "lawyerly
gambits," which reinforce the perception of litigation as "just
a game" and "incapable of delivering real-world justice,"
would have the opposite effect." In this respect, we find
echoes of the criticisms of the appearance jurisprudence of the
89. Id. at 2263 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
90. Id. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). See also Ronald Rotunda,
Judicial Ethics, The Appearance of Impropriety and the Proposed New ABA
Judicial Code, 34 HOF. L. REV. 1337, 1341 (2006) (describing the ABA Code
appearance of impropriety test as a clumsy weapon with the potential to
encourage unwarranted attacks on a judge's reputation, which themselves do
much to undermine public confidence in the judiciary).
Hurling the charge of "appearance of impropriety" . . . is like using
a blunderbuss. Nowadays, we might describe a blunderbuss as a
weapon of terror. It was not a very precise weapon, and marksmen
never used it. Instead, it was good for crowd control, when the goal
was to shoot multiple balls simultaneously in the hope of hitting
something. The ABA has chosen to arm any lawyer or any pundit with
the equivalent of a blunderbuss to attack a judge by giving its
imprimatur to a charge of violating the "appearances of impropriety."
The attack on the judge's ethics seldom results in discipline or
disqualification, but it does serve to besmirch and tarnish a judge's
reputation.
Id.
91. Caperton 129 S. Ct. at 2269 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting).
92. Id. at 2267.
93. Id. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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European court made by the Borgers dissent. 94
Jurisprudential changes, claimed the latter, which prefer
form over substance and seek justification in the need to
respond to changes in popular perceptions, require "a proper
basis in fact."" In this area, at least, American courts may be
more vulnerable than their European counterparts and we
return to this point below." At this stage we comment on the
tensions between legalism and policy, which find their
reflection in the Caperton dissent and constitute, we suggest,
a fundamental dilemma of recusal jurisprudence.
2.3. Legalism versus Policy in Appearance Jurisprudence
In his analysis of the role of appearance discourse in the
context of official impropriety, Andrew Stark has observed
that an appearance test may be open to objection on the
grounds that it is inherently anti-legalistic but this is usually
countered by considerations of policy expressed in terms of
the need to preserve public confidence in the structures of
public life." Two arguments sustain the "legalistic attack": a)
the test involves an element of "anti-legalistic" factual
prejudgment of behavior and b) it violates the principle
against legal retroactivity." The factual prejudgment is that
of the public whose reaction is to be estimated. As Professor
Stark explains:
[N]o trier of fact weighs all the evidence, exculpating and
mitigating as well as incriminating, against a legal
standard of proof, in order to establish that an act of ...
impropriety has been committed. Instead the task . . . is
to estimate the (more or less incomplete) level of the
public's factual knowledge of the case, and the (more or
less) prejudiced inferences the public will draw from that
knowledge. If the public so imagined would believe that
an act of official impropriety has occurred, [the conclusion
must follow] that a violation of the appearance standard
has taken place. [The review body] may then impose
sanctions. Hence, viewed legalistically, appearance
94. Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92, 120 (1993) (Martens, J.,
dissenting).
95. Id.
96. See infra Section III.
97. ANDREW STARK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 207-
32(2000).
98. Id. at 213-20.
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proceedings entail "punishment without crime."99
The charge of "legal retroactivity" is a function of the
vagueness or uncertainty, which accompanies the distinction
between "actual" impropriety and "apparent" impropriety.
The argument goes like this: by definition the circumstances
in which an appearance test is in issue are those in which
there is no clear act of "actual" impropriety. The act
complained of is not one which has been expressly identified
as within the range of legislatively prohibited conduct but is
wrong because it looks wrong by reference to perceptions
which arise only after the act has occurred.'00 Moreover the
fact that the act has not been expressly targeted for
prohibition must indicate that there is no moral consensus
regarding its inherent impropriety:
To say that an official did something that looks wrong is to
enter a realm of normative uncertainty in which citizens
more or less disagree . .. whether a given act is or should
be deemed "official impropriety." Notwithstanding the
formal existence of the appearance rule, then, the term
"appearance of official impropriety" is arguably so vague
that the rule's application, in a given situation, is nothing
the officeholder could have anticipated. The standard
thus becomes retroactive for all intents and purposes. A
law "so vague that [people] of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application [may begin to] violate the first essential of due
process."101
Taking these two challenges together, the argument then
is that an appearance test violates what may be termed the
basic principle of legality, namely that there should be "no
punishment without crime ... and no crime without law."102
In the context of judicial recusal, what this criticism
amounts to is essentially a point about standards: judges
99. Id. at 213.
100. Id. at 217-20.
101. Id. at 218 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926) and referring to Bostjan M. Zupancic, On Legal Formalism: The Principle
of Legality in Criminal Law, 27 LoY. L. REV. 369, 423-24 (1981) ("[Tlhe issue of
vagueness really does not differ from the issue of retroactivity: in both cases the
determination of the precise limit between what is punishable and what is not
is determined post factum . . . . In this sense, a vague law is an ex post facto
law.")).
102. Id. at 210 (quoting JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS AND
POLITICAL TRIALS 152 (1964)).
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must be able to identify danger situations in advance so that
they then can avoid the kind of circumstances that will give
rise to negative perceptions, specifically those having the
effect of undermining public confidence. In the absence of
clear criteria to ground recusal decisions, an appearance test
will not only be difficult to apply but in so far as it will
require judges to recuse themselves in situations where they
feel that they have done nothing wrong and on the basis of a
popular perception-which may be difficult to ascertain and
in terms of its factual basis misguided-it runs the risk of
offending fundamental intuitions of what constitute the basic
norms of legal process and procedure.
In terms of the standard to be applied, the characteristics
of the observer whose perceptions are to be second-guessed
constitute a definitional threshold, the purpose of which is to
achieve a balance between the competing public policy
considerations of appearance jurisprudence. Specifically, the
desire to protect judges from "unsupported, irrational, or
highly tenuous speculation"o or "judge-shopping"'0 4 has
generally been considered to require setting a high threshold
which will operate to preclude the perspective of the ordinary
person in the street. Formulations within the Anglo-
American tradition vary but typically envisage a
disinterested observer who is not only independent of the
court (an "outsider" rather than "insider") but also "fair-
minded," "balance[d]" in the way she arrives at her judgments
and, above all, equipped with more understanding and
knowledge of judicial process than the ordinary person might
be expected to have because she is "informed."' Two recent
103. See United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556, 1558 (11th Cir. 1986).
There are twin, and sometimes competing, policies that bear on the
application of the § 455(a) standard. The first is that courts must not
only be, but must seem to be, free of bias or prejudice . . . . A second
policy is that a judge, having been assigned to a case, should not recuse
himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation. If
this occurred the price of maintaining the purity of the appearance of
justice would be the power of litigants or third parties to exercise a veto
over the assignment of judges.
104. See In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990); see also In re Mann,
229 F.3d 657, 658 (7th Cir. 2000); Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th
Cir. 1998); United State v. Owens, 902 F.2d 1154, 1156 (4th Cir. 1990).
105. See, e.g., Gillies v. Sec'y of State for Work and Pensions, [2006] UKHL 2,
(2006) 1 W.L.R. 781, 784, 787-89; see also Olowofoyeku, supra note 32, at 393-
94 (discussing formulations of the observer in Anglo-American jurisdictions).
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formulations of the U.K.'s highest court envision this paragon
at length:
The "fair-minded and informed observer" is probably not
an insider . . . . Otherwise she would run the risk of
having the insider's blindness to the faults that outsiders
can so easily see. But she is informed. She knows the
relevant facts. And she is fair-minded. 06
The sort of person "who always reserves judgment on
every point until she has seen and fully understood both sides
of the argument," she is not "unduly sensitive or suspicious"
but neither is she complacent: 0 7
She knows that fairness requires that a judge must be,
and must be seen to be, unbiased. She knows that judges,
like anybody else, have their weaknesses. She will not
shrink from the conclusion, if it can be justified
objectively, that things that they have said or done or
associations that they have formed may make it difficult
for them to judge the case before them impartially.108
However, the observer is "informed"; she takes a
"balanced approach to any information she is given" and
before doing so takes the trouble "to inform herself on all
matters that are relevant";
She is the sort of person who takes the trouble to read the
text of an article as well as the headlines. She is able to
put whatever she has read or seen into its overall social,
political or geographical context. She is fair-minded, so
she will appreciate that the context forms an important
part of the material which she must consider before
passing judgment. 09
"Gender-neutral [and possessed of] attributes to which many
... might struggle to attain," it is trite observation that this
"newcomer . . . [to the] legal village" of characters by
reference to whom courts justify their narratives of rational
behavior is a legal fiction."o The role of the informed
106. Gillies, 1 W.L.R. at 793.
107. Helow v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [20081 1 W.L.R. 2416, 2418.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2417-18. See also Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S.
1301, 1302 (2000) ("[Wlhat matters under § 455(a) 'is not the reality of bias or
prejudice but its appearance.' This inquiry is an objective one, made from the
perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts
and circumstances." (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994))).
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observer in reconciling the competing claims of popular
perception upon which public confidence in the integrity of
the judicial system is said to depend and the desire to protect
judges from unwarranted accusations which interfere with
the efficiency of judicial process may be well-understood, but
the danger is that when too much weight is accorded to the
latter, as the Seventh Circuit has observed, "the appearance
of impropriety standard . . . [collapses] into a demand for
proof of actual impropriety""' and a mismatch opens up
between recusal decisions and the perceptions of the ordinary
person in the street. As the Seventh Circuit admonished,
courts must bear in mind that the "reasonable, well-informed
observer of the judicial system" may be "less inclined [than
themselves] to credit judges' impartiality and mental
discipline."" 2 The nature of the exercise then shapes the
unsatisfactory nature of the outcome, an "appearance"
jurisprudence which demonstrates reluctance to engage as
the European Court now seems willing to do with the
perspective of ordinary people who are unfamiliar with the
mysteries of court proceedings but upon whose approbation
legitimacy depends."' We consider these issues now in
relation to the use of technical advisors and comment further
in our conclusion when we return to the growing importance
of appearances in public life.
SECTION II: APPEARANCES AND TECHNICAL ADVISORS
In this section we comment on the differing attitudes of
U.S. courts and the European Court of Human Rights
concerning the application of a doctrine of appearances to the
position of a court advisor. We begin with an extract from a
recent judgment of the U.K. High Court in litigation against
three drug companies concerning the safety of various brands
Accord Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860-61
(1988).
111. In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990).
112. Id. The Supreme Court made a similar point in Liljeberg. 486 U.S. at
864-65 ("The problem ... is that people who have not served on the bench are
often all too willing to indulge suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity of
judges.").
113. Kress v. France, App. No. 39594/98, 2001 Eur. Ct H.R. 1, 81
(unreported). See Olowofoyeku, supra note 32, at 393.
[Vol:51596
2011] PROCESS, OUTCOMES AND TRADITION
of the Combined Oral Contraceptive.'14  Reviewing the
evidence, MacKay J. commented that the expert witness:
proceeded from the witness box to produce four pages of
detailed algebraic calculations ....
.. . I warned him [and counsel] that my own familiarity
with algebra lay in the past and at an elementary level.
Quite undeterred [the witness] proceeded over 8 pages of
transcript, aided by several pages of a flip-chart, to go
through a series of calculations at some speed which
purported to support what he had just said. I considered
the matter overnight with the benefit of the transcript. I
concluded I did not understand this evidence so I thought
it right the next morning to say so in open court. I said
that if this evidence was being relied on as a means of
resolving this dispute I would need to consider the
appointment of a judicial assessor under Section 70 of the
Supreme Court Act 1981 to assist me.115
The increasing complexity of specialized evidence in civil
litigation, coupled with trial efficiency pressures, raises the
prospect of an increased role for technical advisors as judicial
assistants on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States
the extended "gate-keeping" duties which the Supreme Court
now requires in cases of scientific or technical complexity
render the matter topical, but federal courts generally, and
the Supreme Court in particular, have yet to take cognizance
of the "appearance" implications which such appointments
might entail."' The United Kingdom, however, as a member
of the Council of Europe is bound to consider the
jurisprudence of the European Court, specifically the decision
in Kress v. France which we consider next. The effect of the
decision has been interpreted by the U.K. courts in such a
way as to require modification of existing civil procedure
regarding the use of technical advisors but as we argue these
modifications probably do not go far enough to address the
114. X v. Schering Health Care Ltd. [2002] EWHC (QB) 1420, [148]-[49],
(2003) 70 B.M.L.R. 88.
115. Id. Counsel later informed the judge that the Claimants had decided
not to persist with the evidence.
116. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co.
v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993); Adam J. Siegel, Note, Setting Limits on Judicial, Scientific,
Technical, and Other Specialized Fact-finding in the New Millennium, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 167, 168 (2000).
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European concerns."' We compare the position of U.K. courts
with that adopted by U.S. federal courts and comment that
the preference for substance over form, which we detect in the
latter, may promote the efficiency of judicial process, but pays
insufficient attention to the growing importance of popular
perceptions in public life, and sooner rather than later will
need to be revisited.
1. Article 6 Jurisprudence and Court Advisors in the U.K
In the U.K., Article 6 concerns in relation to the use of
technical advisors stem from the 2001 medical negligence
decision in Kress v. France."' At issue was the presence at
the Conseil d'tat's deliberations of the Government
Commissioner who made his submissions after the parties
had addressed the court but did not participate in the vote
despite being a full member of the bench. The court
acknowledged the Government Commissioner's objectivity
and the positive contribution that his submissions made to
the transparency of the decision-making process." 9 The
issues were not those of adversarialism-which could be
addressed by the employment of "sufficient safeguards to
counterbalance the Commissioner's power"12-nOr of judicial
impartiality; during the deliberations the Government
Commissioner, "is only one judge among others and his view
cannot affect the decision of the other judges where he is in a
minority".121
Rather, the doctrine of appearances was called into play;
"[iln publicly expressing his opinion on the rejection or
acceptance of the grounds submitted by one of the parties, the
Government Commissioner could legitimately be regarded by
the parties as taking sides with one or other of them."'2 2
Thus, for "a litigant not familiar with the mysteries of
administrative proceedings," the apparent neutrality of the
proceedings would be compromised.'23 This perception would
117. Kress v. France, App. No. 39594/98, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 85
(unreported).
118. Id.
119. Id. 78.
120. Id. % 80.
121. Id. 1 78.
122. Id. T 81.
123. Kress v. France, App. No. 39594/98, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 9 81
(unreported) (emphasis added).
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be reinforced if the litigant, having heard him make
submissions unfavorable to his case at the end of the public
hearing, then sees the Commissioner "withdraw with the
judges of the trial bench to attend the deliberations held in
the privacy of chambers" where "if only to outward
appearances" he would have "an additional opportunity to
bolster his submissions in private, without fear of
contradiction."1 24 Drawing attention once again to "the
public's increased sensitivity to the fair administration of
justice," and in that context to the importance to be attached
to appearances, the court concluded by ten votes to seven that
there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.'25
The implications of the European Court's approach for
court officials who act as judicial advisors or assistants have
yet to be fully understood. In Vermeulen and Lobo Machado,
the court was unmoved by arguments to the effect that the
presence of government officials at the deliberations of the
national courts was in the capacity of advisor and was
necessary to help ensure the consistency of case-law or to
assist in the final drafting of the judgment.'2 6 As the court
explained in Kress, "the benefit for the trial bench of this
purely technical assistance is to be weighed against the
higher interest of the litigant, who must have a guarantee
that the [national official] will not be able, through his
presence at the deliberations, to influence their outcome."'27
In the United Kingdom, Article 6 concerns in relation to
the role of the legal advisor to the justices in magistrates
courts proceedings arose before the Human Rights Act of
1998 came into force and led to the issue of a practice
direction requiring that any advice given to the justices in
private should be repeated in open court and that the parties
should have an opportunity to make representations on it.128
124. Id. 81-82.
125. Id. 82 (citing Borgers v. Belgium, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92, § 24 (1993)
(internal references omitted)).
126. Vermeulen v. Belgium, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15, 321 (2001); Lobo Machado
v. Portugal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 79, 89 (1997).
127. Kress, Eur. Ct. H.R. 85.
128. Practice Direction (Justices: Clerk to Court), (2000) 1 WLR 1886, 1886-
87. The Human Rights Act 1998 Act which came into force in October 2000 in
effect made the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights directly enforceable
599
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
In the unreported case of Mort v. United Kingdom,"
however, the European Court, noting that the role of the
justices' clerk was confined to assisting the lay magistrates,
distinguished the position from that of officials such as the
Procureur-G~n6ral, Avocat-Gndral or Commissaire du
Gouvernement, "who make submissions to the courts
concerning their personal views on the outcome of particular
cases."130  There being "no question of the justices' clerk
enjoying any role in the proceedings independent of the
justices, or in having any duty with regard to influencing a
decision in any particular direction" then, "[a]ssuming the
clerk fulfils the role provided by law, his or her presence
during the deliberations of the justices must be regarded as
part of the ordinary functioning of the court."'3 ' In Clark v.
Kelly 32 the Privy Council, following this lead, noted the
"essential role" of the legal advisor to lay magistrates and
raised, but did not satisfactorily answer, "the underlying
issue" of the court's independence and impartiality from the
perspective of appearances.13 3 In the words of Lord Hope, "a
balance must be struck" between the demands of process and
the requirements of expediency. 3 1 In a similar vein, the
English Court of Appeal has now directed that admiralty and
patent courts which have traditionally used technical
assessors must modify their procedures in such a way as to
require disclosure of the advice received and to afford to the
parties an opportunity to contend that it should or should not
be followed.' This remains the current position but is
vulnerable to the criticism that these modifications address
in English courts. Id. at 1886.
129. Mort v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44564/98, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(unreported) (discussed in Clark v. Kelly [2003] UKPC D1, [2004] 1 A.C. 681
[709]).
130. Clark, 1 A.C at 690 (quoting Mort, App. No. 44564/98, 2001 Eur. Ct.
H.R.).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 681.
133. Id. at 697.
134. Id. at 701.
135. Bow Spring v. Manzanillo II [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1007 [59], (2005) 1
W.L.R. 144 (followed in Global Mariner v. Atlantic Crusader [2005] EWHC
(Admlty) 380, (2005) 2 All E.R. (Comm) 389. The U.K. Court of Appeals took
the view that such changes were necessary to bring U.K. procedure into line
with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. See Dwyer,
Assessors, supra note 11, at 225-29.
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"equality of arms" issues but not appearances, and the
problem raised by Kress remains-namely the potential for
an appearance of injustice where a litigant sees an advisory
relationship between the deciding judge and a court official
who has made representations inimical to her case.'36
2. Technical Advisors and Due Process Norms in U.S. Federal
Courts
U.S. federal district courts have power to appoint non-
testifying experts to act as judicial assistants under the
Federal Rules of Evidence,' 37 the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 3 8 and the inherent jurisdiction."' In Reilly v.
U.S., Senior District Judge Pettine outlined a range of
activities for a technical advisor which may be regarded as
permissible:
First, the technical advisor translates and interprets for
the court the technical language used in the case. Second,
he offers an exposition and delineation of the technical
disagreement between the parties. Third, he relates this
disagreement to the broader principles of the science or
technical art involved. Fourth, he presents his own
136. See Kress v. France, App. No. 39594/98, Eur. Ct H.R. 1 l 85 (June 7,
2001) (unreported).
137. FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
138. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a) (allowing for the appointment of a "special master"
defined to include a "an assessor"). See Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 383 F. Supp.
699, 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) ("The rule is broad enough to allow appointment of
expert advisors."); see also Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737, 746
(6th Cir. 1979) (authority to appoint "expert advisors or consultants" derives
from either Rule 53 or court's inherent power); Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d
149, 155 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[W]e need not analyze the suggestion (eschewed by all
of the parties to this case) that Fed. R. Civ. P. 53, which deals with the naming
of masters, may be a fertile source of judicial power to retain necessary
technical assistance.").
Note also that 28 U.S.C. 715 (c) & (d) permits the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (CAFC) to hire a senior technical assistant who is a
permanent member of the CAFC staff; the object in part is to ensure consistency
of judgment in issued decisions. See Giles S. Rich, Columbia Law School Julius
Silver Program in Law, Science & Technology-Inaugural Lecture, 68 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 604, 613, 617 (1986). On CAFC see generally LeRoy L.
Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform Through
Specialization for Internet Law and Other High Technology Cases, UCLA J.L. &
TECH. 1, 5-6, 21-22 (2002).
See generally Ellen M. Deason, Managing the Managerial Expert, 1998 U. ILL.
L. REV. 341, 350-55 (1998). "Often . .. courts simply appoint an 'expert' without
discussing the source of their authority." Id. at 345.
139. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1920).
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opinion on the technical facts and related matters at issue.
Finally, he may conduct pertinent experiments, either on
his own or in cooperation with others. 40
However, a study conducted by Federal Judicial Center
researchers in 1993 found little evidence of extensive use of
these appointments and a corresponding "paucity of
published opinions dealing with the exercise of this
authority."'4 In so far as they have considered the matter,
federal courts have rationalized the appointment of a non-
testifying technical court advisor as a member of the judge's
staff equivalent to "a specialized law clerk" and thus
apparently unproblematic.142 There are, however, indications
that some circuit courts now recognize the limits of the
analogy.'4 3 In a class-action challenge to the use of the
California Basic Educational Skills Test (CBEST) as a
requirement for certification to teach and for other
employment in California public schools where the judge had
required the assistance of a court-appointed expert advisor,
Ninth Circuit Judge Tashima noted a general consensus to
the effect that the "law should in some way effectively use
expert knowledge wherever it will aid in settling disputes"'44
but observed:
In some important respects, a technical advisor is quite
unlike a law clerk. A law clerk's function is to aid the
judge in researching legal issues in cases pending before
the court. Because the judge is an expert in the law and
fully understands legal theory and analyses, it is unlikely,
to say the least, that a law clerk will impermissibly usurp
the judicial function. On the other hand, a technical
advisor is brought in precisely because the judge is not
familiar with the complex, technical issues presented in
the case. There is therefore an understandable concern
140. Reilly v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D.R.I. 1988).
141. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation:
Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43
EMORY L.J. 995, 1004, 1018 (1994).
142. Reilly, 682 F. Supp. at 152.
143. See AMAE v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 613-14 (9th Cir. 2000) (Tashima,
J., dissenting (citing Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations
Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901))); see also Katherine
Kmiec Turner, No More Secrets: Under Ballard v. Cmmr., Special Trial Judge
Reports Must Be Revealed, 26 J. NAVL A. ADMIN. L. JUDICIRAY 247, 262-63
(2006).
144. AMAE, 231 F.3d at 609 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
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that the technical advisor's opinion will carry undue
weight with the judge."'
The thrust of Judge Tashima's concern, however, was to
bring advice received onto the judicial record. This is in line
with the general approach of federal courts to date, which has
been to conceptualize problems in connection with the use of a
technical advisor in terms of the risk of actual judicial
impropriety or lack of neutrality on the part of the advisor.'46
In so far as the problem exists, the solution then lies in
procedural safeguards designed to ensure transparency. In
Judge Tashima's formulation:14 7
The use of a technical advisor is not without risks.
First, whenever a court appoints a technical advisor, there
is a danger that the court will rely too heavily on the
expert's advice, thus compromising its role as an
independent decisionmaker and the requirement that its
findings be based only on evidence in the record. This risk
is especially salient if the contents of the communications
between the trial judge and the advisor is hidden from the
parties (and appellate review), and where the parties have
no opportunity to respond to the advisor's statements.
Second, experts in the relevant field, particularly if it is a
narrow and highly-specialized one, may be aligned with
one of the parties; therefore, the district court must make
every effort to ensure the technical advisor's neutrality,
lest the advisor develop into, or give the appearance of
being, an advocate for one side. Without some safeguards,
the parties' confidence in the fairness of the trial will
erode."'
These risks can be minimized by attention to procedure.
Thus, "minimally" a district court appointing a technical
advisor should:
1) utilize a fair and open [appointments] procedure ... ,2)
address any allegations of bias, partiality, or lack of
qualification; 3) clearly define and limit the technical
advisor's duties; 4) make clear to the technical advisor
that any advice he gives to the court cannot be based on
any extra-record information; and 5) make explicit, either
through an expert's report or a record of ex parte
145. Id. at 613-14 (citations omitted).
146. Id. at 610-11.
147. Id. at 591 (Graber, J., majority opinion).
148. Id. at 610-11 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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communications, the nature and content of the technical
advisor's advice. 149
Judge Tashima's recommendations were designed to
bring evidence of assistance received by a judge onto the
judicial record and, thus, amenable to appellate review, but
the focus on what might be termed "adversarial" issues fails
to engage with the "appearance" issues, which we argue arise
here. The Seventh Circuit decision in Edgar v. KL."s
represents possibly the closest federal courts have come so
far in recognizing the potential for technical advisor
appointments to raise problems of apparent bias. In Edgar,
the court concluded that where a judge in a mental health
case had private meetings and engaged in ex parte
communications with a panel of court-appointed experts who
were known to be partisan, he had compromised his
impartiality.'s Section 455(a) "appearance" issues arose
because the judge made no secret of the confidence that he
reposed in his advisors; 5 2 the relationship had become
"excessively cozy"153 and a reasonable observer would have
had concerns about the court's ability to conduct the trial
impartially as a result. 5 4 Closer reading, however, indicates
that what really seems to have troubled the Seventh Circuit
in Edgar was the substantive issue that the judge had in fact
impermissibly accepted contestable conclusions, which had
not been tested in court.' 5 Thus, where the district judge had
blocked discovery and declined to state on the record his own
memories of what had happened, his claim of judicial
privilege invited the inference of impropriety. 5 1
Two recent Ninth Circuit decisions evidence a similar
preference for substance over form. In A & M Records v.
Napster Inc.,' the appellate court dismissed a challenge
where the technical advisor did not "displace the district
149. Id. at 611.
150. Edgar v. K.L., 93 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Duff v.
Governor of Illinois, 519 U.S. 1111 (1997).
151. Id.
152. See id. at 260.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Edgar v. K.L., 93 F.3d 256, 258-60 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom.
Duff v. Governor of Illinois, 519 U.S. 1111 (1997).
157. A & M Records v. Napster Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
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court's judicial role" nor "unilaterally issue [] findings of fact
or conclusions of law regarding [defendant Napster's]
compliance."' However, in Federal Trade Comm'n v.
Entforma Natural Products, Inc.,1' a similar challenge
succeeded where the court found that, although the record
was sparse, there was evidence of actual improper reliance. 60
In neither decision is there concern that the fact of the
relationship per se might raise "appearance" issues.
Clearly there is scope for this type of allegation to be
opportunistic in character and this may be a partial
explanation for the lacuna we detect here. In Reilly itself-
where there was no evidence to suggest that the district court
had "allowed the boundaries to be overrun"'5 ' but the judge
had failed to provide written instructions and the advisor had
submitted no written report-the First Circuit was unwilling
to sustain a challenge motivated by opportunism.'62
Similar considerations may apply where the challenges
have been generated in a context of a history of opposition to
the authority of the court, clearly a factor in two decisions
from the desegregation era: U.S. v. Yonkers Board of
Education,'6 ' a housing case, and Bradley v. Millikin, a school
case.'64 In Yonkers, where the district court had appointed an
outside housing advisor to provide expert advice and
assistance regarding the implementation of the court's orders
and to coordinate the activity of various parties, including
government agencies, the Second Circuit concluded that the
judge's ex parte contacts were "merely part of the
performance of [the judge's] prescribed duty and did not
create an appearance of partiality on the part of the district
court judge."' Moreover, his refusal to disclose the content
of communications with his advisors was upheld: "a degree of
confidentiality [was] . . . justifiable in light of attempts to
158. Id. at 1097.
159. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Entforma Natural Products, Inc., 362 F.3d 1204
(9th Cir. 2004).
160. Id. at 1214 n.10 ("The district court judge indicated that 'If the court-
appointed expert agrees with the Defendants, I suspect I'm going to agree with
him. If he agrees with the Plaintiffs, I suspect I'm going to agree with him.'").
161. Reilly v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 150, 158 (D.R.I. 1988).
162. Id. at 161.
163. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1991).
164. Bradley v. Millikin, 620 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1980).
165. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d at 184. See also discussion in Cobell v.
Norton, 237 F. Supp. 2d 71, 90 (D.D.C. 2003).
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block implementation of [the consent decree] by the City and
other groups.""'s
Similarly, in Bradley, the Sixth Circuit upheld Judge
DeMascio's refusal to recuse himself on the grounds that his
ex parte contacts and discussions with court-appointed
experts and community groups violated Canon 3A(4) of the
Code of Conduct for United States Judges; there, the remedial
phase of the litigation had been protracted and arduous,"6 '
the judge had conducted himself in an exemplary manner,"
and the court's authority to utilize experts was not in issue.
The Sixth Circuit asserted simply: "We do not believe Judge
DeMascio's use of experts, or his receipt through them of
community and expert views . . . required recusal.'."'' The
court did, however, express its concern about the absence of a
documentary record and required that all future expert
assistance should be recorded in written reports, with copies
to all parties.o
More recently, the D.C. Circuit's Brooks decision
considered the extent to which a reasonable and informed
observer would have questioned the impartiality of a district
judge who had regular meetings with a special master and a
court monitor who acted as his agents over a four-year period.
Noting that the litigation was "complicated and
contentious,""' the court accepted the judge's unequivocal
166. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 946 F.2d at 185.
167. Bradley, 620 F.2d at 1158 (noting that Canon 3A(4) of the Code of
Conduct for United States Judges prohibits a judge from initiating or
considering ex parte communications from "persons who are not participants to
the proceedings"). The provisions of the Code are advisory and failure to comply
does not necessarily attract sanctions. Id.
168. Id. See also Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. and Training Sch., 757 F.
Supp. 1231, 1239-40 (D.N.M. 1990) (District judge refused to recuse himself on
the grounds of ex parte communications with his court expert where the judge
stated that he had not been influenced by nor relied on the expert's findings or
opinions, a reasonable person would not have doubted the judge's impartiality
and the challenge was an attempt to avoid the consequence of an anticipated
adverse decision). But cf United States v. Craven, 239 F.3d 91, 101-03 (1st Cir.
2001) (In a criminal case ex parte communications with court-appointed
psychologist prior to sentencing constituted error; the sentence would be
vacated and the case remanded to another judge for sentencing.).
169. Bradley, 620 F.2d at 1158.
170. Id. In relation to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) the court ruled that the judge's
activities were judicial and thus outside the scope of the statute. Id. at 1157.
Post Liteky v. United States these arguments no longer stand. Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
171. In re Brooks, 383 F.3d 1036, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (denying petition
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assurance that no substantive information had been
improperly obtained.172
Judge Tashima's attempt to formulate procedural
guidelines for judges using technical advisors, which now
appears to form part of Ninth Circuit law, had been
anticipated by the First Circuit in Reilly, but the underlying
purpose is far from clear.173 The Reilly Court spoke of
"prophylactic measures" and of "fundamental fairness,"'7 4 but
did not explain whether the prophylaxis was directed towards
substance or appearance or both. Subsequent Ninth Circuit
endorsement has stressed the importance of procedure in
facilitating appellate review suggesting that the target is
substantive impropriety rather than appearances.17
However, as the Third Circuit has pointed out, fairness-as-
appearance itself has two aims and the requirements of §
4556 address "not only fairness to the litigants but also the
public's confidence in the judiciary, which may be irreparably
harmed if a case is allowed to proceed before a judge who
appears to be tainted."'7  Procedural safeguards designed to
prevent substantive impropriety or to facilitate correction on
appellate review address the first of these aims but not the
second.
Moreover, it is difficult to understand how either
prophylaxis or justification can have much of a role within an
analytical matrix which purports to make no ontological
from a writ of mandamus requiring recusal of District Court Judge Lamberth).
172. Id. at 1041-43.
173. AMAE v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 611 (Tashima, J., dissenting), applied
in Techsearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(predicting that these guidelines now formed part of Ninth Circuit law). See
Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 203 F. Supp. 2d 27, 31 n.3 (D.D.C. 2002)
(noting that it had been guided "in large part by the extremely thoughtful and
oft-cited dissent of Judge Tashima in [AMAE]"); see also Fed. Trade Comm'n v.
Enforma Natural Products, Inc., 362 F.3d 1204, 1214 (9th Cir. 2004) ("We take
this opportunity to join a number of courts that have endorsed Judge Tashima's
recommendations").
174. Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 159-60 (1988).
175. Enforma Natural Products, Inc., 362 F.3d at 1215 ("On remand, the
district court should consider implementing some or all of these safeguards
[regarding the use of technical advisors] to assure the parties that the court is
proceeding openly and fairly. Employment of these standards will aid in
appellate review if such review becomes necessary").
176. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006).
177. In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 776 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing
Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859-60 (1988)).
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distinction between appearance and substance. As Professor
Stark points out, the fact that a process appears improper
ought in principle to make it actually improper. 7 s If as the
cases suggest, appellate courts are willing to sanction
occasional judicial forays outside the confines of adversarial
process on the grounds of the particular circumstances of the
case, the answer must be that they have done so
pragmatically and because they recognize with Judge
Tashima that the role played by a technical advisor is
"unique.""' The question is whether in so doing they have
succumbed to the temptation to "look into the mirror" of their
own experience and understanding and as a result moved too
far from the perceptions of the ordinary members of the
public upon which confidence in the administration of justice
must ultimately depend.so If, as we suggest, the reluctance
of courts today to conceptualize relations between judge and
advisor in impropriety terms stems from pragmatic grounds,
what is at issue is the relative priority to be accorded to the
reliability of outcomes over the norms of adversarial
process.' 8'
3. Rectitude in Decision-Making: The Connection between
Process and Outcomes
It has been recently asserted that "[t]he sound
178. See STARK, supra note 97, at 21-35 (explaining that "appearance"
standards, as opposed to "conflict of interest" prohibitions should not be
regarded as prophylactic).
179. AMAE v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 613 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000).
180. R v. Sec'y of State for the Env't, Ex parte Kirstall Valley Campaign
[1996] 3 All E.R. (QB) 304 at 316 (Sedley, J.) ("The House also eliminated from
the process of adjudication the imaginary reasonable man, recognizing that in
imputing to him all that is eventually known to the court and asking him for his
impression, the court is looking into a mirror.").
181. See United States v. Bonds, 18 F.3d 1327 (6th Cir. 1994); Jackson v.
Fort Stanton Hosp. and Training Sch., 757 F. Supp. 1231 (D.N.M. 1990); Siegel,
supra note 116, at 196-97 (citing Bradley v. Millikin, 620 F.2d 1143, 1158 (6th
Cir. 1980)); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
[T]he trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a
particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert
testimony is reliable . ...
The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how
to test an expert's reliability, and to decide whether or when special
briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability, as it
enjoys when it decides whether that expert's relevant testimony is
reliable.
Id.
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administration of justice is grounded in rectitude of decision
by the tribunal of fact." 82 For Jeremy Bentham rectitude, by
which he meant accurate outcomes, or the correct application
of the law to the facts, was dictated by the principle of utility,
and procedure was to be its servant. It followed for him that
the integrity of the end result or outcomes should not be
compromised by extraneous considerations such as the desire
to provide procedural protections for defendants in criminal
trials."' For this reason, asserts Galligan, "we can be sure
[Bentham] would have disapproved" of the raft of procedural
devices such as the "right to silence, the privilege against self-
incrimination, the rules requiring voluntary confessions, and
a general doctrine of fairness" to which, in one form or
another, and to a greater or lesser extent, the modern
common-law world has now become accustomed, despite the
obstacles that such protections might place in the way of
successful prosecution of a guilty defendant. 8 4
Extrapolating into the wider context, the insight that
legal processes serve social goals which can be expected to
change over time generates a model of procedural justice in
which procedural norms can be linked to the values of the
social and moral matrix within which they operate. If the
behavior of legal officials is governed by legal standards
which are normally ascertainable in accordance with the
norms of positivist legal method, it is nevertheless to be
expected that these legal standards will be reflexive with, and
responsive to, the wider social context and specifically to the
expectations of the wider public concerning legal outcomes. 88
Two points follow from this. The first is about change:
"[slometimes a new normative standard will be adopted by
officials, reflecting their concern to advance a particular
social goal or moral value."'*8  We suggest that the current
enthusiasm for what we have termed the "doctrine of
appearances" is best understood when seen in this light and
we take up this point later.8 7
182. Deirdre Dwyer, The Causes and Manifestations of Bias in Civil Expert
Evidence, 26 CIV. JUST. Q. 425, 425 (2007).
183. See GALLIGAN, supra note 22 at 9-12.
184. Id. at 12.
185. Id. at 17.
186. Id.
187. See infra notes 243-62 and accompanying text.
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The second point concerns the relationship between
procedure and outcomes. Specifically, Galligan's contention
that the fair treatment of individuals is directly bound up
with the accurate application of law or rectitude of decision-
making so that models of so-called "dignitary" or "process"
values arising out of the principle of respect for persons,
which purport to offer a non-instrumental or non-outcome-
dependent account of procedural fairness, are misconceived.18 8
Laws may be made in pursuit of social goals and for the
common good but the consequence is to generate normative
entitlements for those individuals who come within the scope
of the law when properly applied. If, as Galligan claims,
fairness "rests on the general principle that a person is
treated fairly if he is treated in a way to which he has a
justifiable claim," it follows that a mistaken decision which
produces an incorrect outcome constitutes a denial of those
rights and the link between procedures and outcomes is
established."' The purpose of procedures is to guarantee not
only that the legal standards are properly applied but that
people will be treated "in accordance with their normative
expectations [a principle which] is at the very foundation of
fair treatment and procedural fairness."1o
On this analysis, procedural norms such as the rules
relating to judicial neutrality and the right to a hearing,
whilst they may have a value that is expressive of the respect
owed to individuals in a liberal democracy, are primarily
instrumental in character because they are immediately
directed towards the production of good outcomes:
Bias on the part of the decision-maker is condemned
because of the threat it poses to an accurate outcome,
while a hearing is important because it is likely to provide
relevant and often vital information and to reveal a side of
the story which would otherwise remain untold. The
combined effect of such procedural standards is the
likelihood of their leading to a more accurate outcome.''
An appearance of bias test however is consistently
defended on the basis of the asserted need to maintain public
188. On "dignitary values" see JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985).
189. GALLIGAN, supra note 22, at 52.
190. Id. at 42.
191. Id. at 92.
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confidence in the integrity of legal process; but here again, as
Professor Galligan points out, confidence in procedures and
confidence in their outcomes go hand in hand: "confidence
that the law has been properly applied . . . depends to a
significant degree on confidence in the procedures as a means
to those outcomes"19 2 and "confidence in the result is bolstered
by employing procedures which reduce as far as possible the
risks of error."'9 3 On this logic and in relation to the technical
advisor at least, the conclusion would then be that rules
relating to bias should not be interpreted so as to put
obstacles in the way of a judge who seeks expert help as a
means of maximizing the accuracy of her decision-making. In
this respect, the U.S. courts would seem to have it right, and
the appearance jurisprudence of the European Court as
presently interpreted within the U.K. rests on shaky
foundations.
It should also follow that an expansive interpretation of
the rules in such a way as to prioritize the appearance of
justice as a good per se, irrespective of the effect this might
have on the production of outcomes, would be over-
simplistic:"'
Something is seriously wrong with an account of
procedural fairness which emphasizes the inherent value
of procedural rules about hearing and bias to the almost
total neglect of their instrumental role in upholding
normative expectations relating to outcomes. This is not
to deny that the hearing and bias rules may have value
independently of outcomes; but it is to insist that
whatever non-instrumental value they have is subsidiary
to their instrumental role.'
This then forms the basis of Professor Galligan's criticism
of Professor Tyler's conclusions with which we began this
paper.'s To the extent that his studies purport to show
empirically that people value procedures independently of
outcomes, the link he seeks to make between the appearance
of fairness and legitimacy rests on flawed theoretical
192. Id. at 66.
193. Id. at 68.
194. See id. at 55.
195. GALLIGAN, supra note 22, at 93.
196. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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assumptions."'7 Professor Tyler's study Why People Obey the
Law was based on the results of interviews conducted in
Chicago 1984 in which people were asked about their views of
police and the courts. 98 It articulates a conception of the
relationship between authority and citizen in which the
legitimacy of the former derives from popular consent, which
in turn stems from the citizen's experience and is shaped by
the perception that the treatment received has been
procedurally fair.'9 In this analysis, what is important is not
outcomes but rather psychological factors reflecting what are
termed "relational criteria" because they "provide people with
feedback about the quality of their relationship with
authorities and institutions." 0o These criteria, claimed to be
non-instrumental in character because they arise
independently of concern with the quality of outcomes
include:
assessments of the quality of interpersonal treatments,
(are people treated with dignity and respect? are their
rights respected?) and evaluations of the trustworthiness
of authorities, as well as judgments about the neutrality of
decision making and the degree to which opportunities to
participate are provided.201
What is missing, however, is Galligan's insight that
satisfaction of these criteria alone is unlikely to produce a
confidence vote where the respondent considers that the
ultimate outcome was incorrect. Rather than praise for the
fairness of the procedures, the suggestion is that he is more
likely to conclude that "the procedures failed in their primary
purpose and, therefore, despite appearances, are inadequate
and defective."202
Nevertheless, as Professor Galligan has also observed,
"each generation argues anew about where the line between
rectitude and competing values should be drawn."2 03 In the
following section we consider the suggestion that
notwithstanding the logic of the position that we have
197. See GALLIGAN, supra note 22, at 89-95.
198. See TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 2, at 8-15.
199. Id. at 272-78.
200. Id. at 276 (internal reference omitted).
201. Id.
202. GALLIGAN, supra note 22, at 93.
203. Id. at 35.
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outlined, the majority decision in Caperton represents a
commitment to the view that the significance of appearances
in public life is a matter that the court should take cognizance
of, that this is so irrespective of whether the suspicions that
have generated the appearance of impropriety are justifiable,
i.e. borne out by the underlying facts, and as such is best seen
as an addition to what may be a developing and complex
"jurisprudence of appearance."2 0 4
SECTION III: THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF APPEARANCES
IN PUBLIC LIFE
1. The Court of Public Opinion
The refusal of Justice Benjamin to step down in Caperton
was not the first time a recusal decision had attracted
widespread publicity. In 2004, Justice Scalia took the
unusual step of issuing a statement to explain his refusal to
recuse himself in a case brought by the Sierra Club
challenging the secrecy surrounding an energy task force
headed by Vice President Cheney in circumstances in which
his refusal had attracted considerable public attention and
widespread criticism in the national press. 2 05  This was the
third in a series of high profile "recusal dilemmas" involving
members of the Supreme Court.2 06 In Laird v. Tatum,207
Justice Rehnquist's rejection of a recusal motion that was
based on his professional experience at the Department of
Justice has been described as "one of the most serious ethical
lapses in the Court's history."20 8 Similarly, Justice Black's
204. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009). See
Karlan, supra note 80, at 98.
205. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004). Justice Scalia together
with members of his family had joined the Vice President in a duck-hunting
expedition and shared his travel arrangements on a government plane though
the overall cost of travel was not thereby reduced. Id. at 928.
206. R. Matthew Pearson, Duck, Duck Recuse? Foreign Common Law
Guidance and Improving Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1799, 1800 n.2 (2005).
207. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 839 (1972).
208. JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 209 (1974). Justice
Rehnquist conceded:
Respondents are substantially correct in characterizing my
appearance before [a Congressional sub-committee] as an 'expert
witness for the Justice Department' on the subject of statutory and
constitutional law dealing with the authority of the Executive Branch
to gather information. They are also correct in stating that during the
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decision to participate in a case where the litigant twenty
years before had been Black's law partner triggered a thinly-
veiled criticism from Justice Jackson and newspaper reports
of a feud in the court.209 Justice Scalia's "angry"210 Cheney
memorandum noted the Sierra Club's argument that public
opinion "as reflected in the nation's newspaper editorials,
[had] unanimously concluded that there [was] an appearance
of favoritism," with "'8 of the 10 newspapers with the largest
circulation in the United States, 14 of the largest 20, and 20
of the 30 largest"' calling him to step aside, but rejected
robustly the conclusion that from the perspective of the
objective observer his neutrality had thereby been
compromised. 2 11 The implications of the argument that he
should bow to the demands of the press claiming to represent
the American public were, he wrote, "staggering"12 but as
Justice Breyer-who voted with the Caperton majority-
observed extra-judicially in 2008, "the judicial system, in a
sense, floats on a sea of public opinion.""'3 The Justice's
remarks were prompted by poll results indicating an
"alarming" decline between 2001 and 2005 in public
confidence in judicial impartiality.21 4 Polled in 2001 two-
thirds of the respondents indicated their support for the view
that judges decided cases impartially. By 2005 approximately
half the respondents appeared to believe that judicial
decision-making reflects the personal predilections of the
judge. This apparently "skeptical view of judging," wrote
Justice Breyer:
is not shared by the judges. We believe when we decide a
course of my testimony at that hearing, and on other occasions, I
expressed an understanding of the law, as established by decided cases
of this Court and of other courts, which was contrary to the contentions
of respondents in this case. Respondents' reference, however, to my
'intimate knowledge of the evidence underlying the respondents'
allegations' seems to me to make a great deal of very little.
Laird, 409 U.S. at 825-26 (Rehnquist, J., denying motion to recuse).
209. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325
U.S. 897, 897 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). See Frank, supra note 40, at
605-06 n.2.
210. Editorial, Justice in a Bind, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004, at A12.
211. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 923 (2004) (quoting Motion to
Recuse at 3-4, Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (No. 03-475)).
212. Id.
213. Stephen Breyer, Serving America's Best Interests, 4 DAEDALUS 137, 139
(2008).
214. Id.
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case that we exercise not subjective preference but our
judgment based on law . . . . A serious discrepancy
between our own view of our own efforts and the view of a
large segment of the public is cause for concern in a
democracy.215
Sir Jack Jacob-commenting on the transformation that
took place in English civil procedure in the years following
1800-has observed that whilst the intellectual trigger was
Jeremy Bentham and the influence of new ideas driven by
rapidly developing social and economic forces had prepared
the ground, the legal profession and judiciary, complacent in
a Blackstone-engendered "euphoria," generally defended the
status quo.216 Change when it came owed much to the "force
of public opinion" expressed then as now through the columns
of the press:
the striking characteristic of the British revolt against the
apotheosis of legal formalism was its popular origin and
support ... . One is amazed by the violence of the attack
which the public directed and maintained for at least two
generations through the press. It was not only a war
against legal abuses, but a class struggle against a
profession which was believed to be responsible for
them.217
It has been argued that a "fully informed, fair-minded,
and knowledgeable observer" would understand the
distinction between suits against officials in their official
capacity and suits against government employees as private
individuals and thus would agree with Justice Scalia's
decision that his neutrality in the Cheney case was not
compromised.21 8 This may be so, but to pose the question in
these terms is to fail to engage with the requirement for the
connection between legal formulations of ethical principles
215. Id.
216. SIR JACK I.H. JACOB, THE REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW AND
OTHER ESSAYS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 204-08 (1982) ("[The Bench and Bar ...
basked in the euphoria engendered by Blackstone's extravagant eulogies of the
prevailing system and his resounding phrases extolling 'its solid foundations . . .
its extensive plan . . . the harmonious concurrence of its several parts . . . the
elegant proportions of the whole.'" (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *443, and citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*268)).
217. Id. at 208 (quoting Edson R. Sunderland, The English Struggle for
Procedural Reform, 39 HARV. L. REV. 725, 729, 731 (1925-26)).
218. Pearson, supra note 206, at 1839.
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and a "common sense understanding of fairness" which may
not directly engage with the connection between procedures
and outcomes as Professor Galligan might wish, but which
nevertheless recognizes and responds intuitively to the
unacceptable when it sees it. 219
Similar arguments may be made about the recent U.K.
furor surrounding the issue of the expenses of Members of
Parliament. An Ipsos- MORI poll carried out for the BBC and
published in June 2009 revealed that 76% do not trust
Members of Parliament in general to tell the truth, 68%
believe that half or more MPs use power for their own
personal gain, 68% think that most MPs make a lot of money
by using public office improperly (46% thought this in 1985,
and 64% in 1994), and only 37% believe that most MPs have
a high moral code (and 58% disagree that they do). 220 The
report concluded that "[t]his is nevertheless more positive
than in 1994, when 28% felt that most MPs have a high moral
code."22 ' The point is, and here the parallel lies, that from a
strictly legal point of view it is doubtful whether many of the
MPs who have been vilified in the national press in respect of
their expenses claims have actually "done anything wrong."
From the standpoint of popular perception, however, the
issue of legal niceties was of no concern. What mattered was
the judgment of the "court of public opinion."
2. Prejudice, Bias and a "More Recent Humility"
In 1947, John P. Frank-reviewing then current judicial
disqualification practices-commented on Justice Jackson's
criticism of Justice Black's refusal to recuse in the Jewell
Ridge case,22 2 and asserted that whereas disqualification for
bias represented "a complete departure from common law
principles," nevertheless despite Blackstone's denial, "a more
recent humility has prompted recognition" of the possibility
219. Editorial, supra note 210.
220. Ipsos MORI Expenses Poll for the BBC, IPSOS (June 2,
2009), http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.
aspx?oltemId=2349.
221. Id.
222. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325
U.S. 897 (1945). Mr. Frank, a former law clerk to Justice Hugo L. Black in the
October 1942 term, acknowledged the potential for author disqualification:
"That relationship bred affections which may be reflected in this article."
Frank, supra note 40, at 605 n.1.
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that "human judges" may succumb to "less tangible
prejudices" and thereby deny justice.2 In the classic model
of judicial neutrality as envisaged by Justice Cardozo, the
issue of objectivity is not problematic. A judge must simply
"disengage himself, so far as possible, of every influence that
is personal or that comes from the particular situation which
is presented to him, and base his judicial decision on elements
of an objective nature. 224
In this formulation, elimination of conscious prejudice is
a sine qua non of neutrality, but this is seen as something
that is within the power of the judge to recognize and control.
Recusal jurisprudence generally reflects these assumptions
but the model is undermined by developments in social
psychology, specifically the rise of social cognition theory
which sees unconscious or innate bias as an aspect of
cognitive development, arising in response to social
mechanisms of which individual actors are themselves largely
unaware.225 The distinction we attempted in our introduction
between "bias" (impermissible) and "partiality" (innate)
draws on these insights, but the extent to which the law
should or indeed can take cognizance of them is difficult to
assess. Linda Hamilton Krieger's work on unconscious bias
in employment discrimination represents an attempt to find a
legal forum for this research as does a recent study into the
way judges and jurors remember the facts of cases, which
argues that the effect of unconscious or implicit racial bias on
case outcomes "raises concerns about the legal system's
ability to achieve social justice."2 26
In cases involving judicial recusal, actual bias or
223. Frank, supra note 40, at 618-19.
224. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 121 (1920).
225. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995) ("[P]eople's access to their own cognitive processes is
in fact poor."); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup
Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1279, 1316, 1332
(1998) (defining social cognition theory as the sub-discipline of social psychology
that studies patterns of human cognition that bias social perception); see also
Laurie A. Rudman, Social Justice in Our Minds, Homes, and Society: The
Nature, Causes, and Consequences of Implicit Bias, 17 SOc. JUST. RES. 129,
133-39 (2004) (explaining the involuntary nature and potential consequences of
implicit biases).
226. Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decision-
Making, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L. J. 345, 345 (2007).
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conscious prejudice is rarely the issue. We suggest that the
negative response to Justice Scalia's refusal to recuse in
Cheney,227 reflected an acceptance of something much more
sophisticated, namely an intuitive understanding of the
connection between association and influence on the part of a
public that has become accustomed to modern advertising
industry attempts to manipulate its consumer spending with
techniques including those of celebrity endorsement aimed at
tapping into or shaping the unconscious values and desires
which will influence the desire for the advertised product.
Writing in 1957, Vance Packard described the growth of a
new manipulative approach to advertising which instead of
providing information about the product attempted "to
channel our unthinking habits, our purchasing decisions, and
our thought processes by the use of insights gleaned from
psychiatry and the social sciences." 2 "2  Packard called these
efforts at persuasion "hidden" because, typically, they "take
place beneath our level of awareness."2 29 Yet fifty years on
when it is widely known that the moral peccadilloes of
celebrities such as Tiger Woods or Kate Moss threaten their
product sponsorship contracts, it is reasonable to assume that
the public now has a reasonably sophisticated awareness of
the reflexive potential of subliminal influence or "influence by
association," as we now term it.2 3 0
In the context of judicial decision-making, the recent
work on "panel effect[s]," suggesting that the composition of
the court can have an effect on outcomes, bears out these
intuitions,23 and indeed the terminology of recusal
jurisprudence in its appearance formulations has begun to
recognize the complexities of human motivation and
227. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 928 (2004).
228. VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS 3 (1957).
229. Id.
230. Id. See also Rudman, supra note 225, at 138 (asserting that one of the
conclusions of the research into cognitive causes of implicit bias is that "it is an
axiom that proximity leads to attraction").
231. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493, 1536
(2008) (finding that in Voting Rights Act cases the composition of the panel
affected the outcome; "[wihite judges who sat on panels with at least one
African-American judge were considerably more likely to vote in favor of
liability, and this effect was evident for both Democratic and Republican
appointees"); accord Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology,
and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997).
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behavior.232 In Lawal v. Northern Spirit Ltd, the U.K. Privy
Council's decision that an advocate who was a part-time
member of the Employment Appeal Tribunal could not act as
counsel in a case where the tribunal included lay members
with whom he had previously sat tackled the issue head-on.
A fair-minded and informed observer, the court held, would
conclude there was a real possibility of subconscious bias on
the part of the lay member or lay members.23 4
In the context of judicial advisors, as we have suggested,
U.S. courts have so far failed to make the connection and the
jurisprudence of the European Court is ahead in this
respect.235 In Caperton, however, the Court addressed the
issue of influence directly, not just in terms of causation,2 36
but also in terms of psychology; Justice Benjamin would "feel
a debt of gratitude to Blankenship for his extraordinary
efforts to get him elected" and might in consequence succumb
to temptation, which is "strong and inherent in human
nature."23 7 We suggest that from a political perspective the
majority were right to do so. As has been observed and we
now consider: "ours is a more venal age."238
3. Appearance and Tradition in a Normative Universe
Justice Scalia justified his refusal to recuse by reference
232. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (requiring "a realistic
appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness").
233. Lawal v. Northern Spirit Ltd., [20031 UKHL 35, [2003] I.C.R. 856, 857.
234. Id. at 865-66.
235. In similar fashion a recent decision of the U.K.'s highest court was
unmoved by the suggestion that a judge's decision-making is reflective of the
opinions of an organization of which she is a member. See Helow v. Advocate
General for Scotland, [2008] UKHL 62, [2008] 1 W.L.R. 2416, 2418-20 (Lord
Hope of Craighead) (finding that a decision of the Lord Ordinary not to give
permission to appeal against a notice of removal in respect of a woman of
Palestinian ethnicity, who claimed asylum on the basis that she had been
politically involved with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, was not
vitiated by bias on the grounds that the judge was a member of the
International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists and a founder member
of the Scottish branch of that association. A fair-minded observer would not
have concluded that the Lord Ordinary was biased. Judges could be assumed to
be capable of detaching their minds from things contained in reading material
that they did not agree with.).
236. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2264 (2009) ("[W~e
conclude that Blankenship's campaign efforts had a significant and
disproportionate influence in placing Justice Benjamin on the case.").
237. Id. at 2262.
238. JACOB, supra note 47, at 198-99.
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to precedent, citing in particular Justice Byron White's
friendship with Robert Kennedy and his family (which
included ski vacations) and Justice Robert Jackson's social
relationship with President Franklin D. Roosevelt.23 9 In
response to the argument that "times have changed" and that
for example Justice Marshall, judged by modern standards,
could not have sat in Marbury v. Madison,2 40 the justice was
only partially persuaded. But as John P MacKenzie, making
a plea for the judiciary to "look more deeply into the interests
of the consumers of justice as perceived by them," has argued:
In an age when images-televised or conjured up by
molders of public opinion and taste-often blend so
confusingly with reality, does not the appearance of justice
have something to do with the reality of justice? If
justices and judges would pay more attention to
appearances, would there not be more hope that they are
performing their tasks justly? If the "consumers" of the
judicial system perceive it as just, on the basis of fair
disclosure of its actual operations, what more can they ask
of the system? . . . [Tihe appearance of justice is an
indispensable element of justice itself.2 4 1
Justice Scalia himself has recognized that notions of
disqualification have evolved over time, but in Cheney he
drew the wrong conclusion and did damage not only to his
reputation but to the reputation of the Court.2 42 Just as
recusal jurisprudence is no longer limited by the practical
difficulties of finding substitute judges prevailing in the time
of Blackstone so now, we argue, the jurisprudence of
contemporary courts should not detach itself from, but must
engage with, the uneasy relationship between appearance
and reality, arguably the defining problem of the modem
age. 243
For Justice Benjamin in Caperton, the "fundamental
239. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 924-26 (2004).
240. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (Chief Justice Marshall wrote
the opinion of the Court although he had been personally involved as the
Secretary of State who had failed to deliver the warrants in issue).
241. MACKENZIE, supra note 208, at 241.
242. See Cheney, 541 U.S. 913; Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 543-44
(1994).
243. Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at 17, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009)
(No. 08-22).
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question" was "whether, in a free society, we should value
'apparent or political justice' more than 'actual justice.' ""
The former is "subject to the manipulation of information and
opinion via innuendo, half-truths, suggestive claims, and so
on."' Public confidence in the judicial system, however,
depends upon the latter measured not by reference to the
acceptability of outcomes to "partisan constituencies"24 6 or
those with vested interests in specific outcomes in given
cases, but by reference to "the accuracy of justice."2 47 In so far
as the judge means here the accuracy of judicial outcomes,
then as we have argued, we have some sympathy with this
view. An account of the relationship between procedures and
appearances, which fails to take account of the connection
with accurate outcomes rests, as we have explained, upon
thin theoretical ground, but the relationship between trust
and appearances is not so easily disposed of. Trust, as Onora
O'Neill has noted, is "valuable social capital," "hard earned,"
"easily dissipated" and "not to be squandered."2 4 8  A
appearance test which stigmatizes where there is no
impropriety may be counter-productive: "[d]ecisions . .. that
reinforce subjective standards of adjudication on matters of
judicial impartiality simply squander the remaining vestiges
of the social capital of trust, and fan the flames of
suspicion."249
However, as Justice Benjamin himself recognized, the
judicial system does not exist in a vacuum and in the United
States, where courts at both state and federal level are
already seen as highly politicized, the balance of
considerations changes.25 0 We consider that it is one of the
ironies of our discussion that in the United Kingdom, where
the distrust of politicians has not yet transmuted into a
perception of a politicized judiciary, the high priority accorded
to appearance principles rules out the use of technical
advisors and with them the potential for enhanced accuracy
of judicial outcomes, but in the United States, where judges
244. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 294 (W. Va. 2008)
(Benjamin, J., concurring).
245. Id. at 285 n.1.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 293 n.14.
248. O'NEILL, supra note 18, at 6-7.
249. Olowofoyeku, supra note 37, at 34.
250. Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 293 (Benjamin, J., concurring).
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are with some justification seen as political actors, the
opposite conclusion prevails.2 5 ' Be that as it may, what then
is or should be the significance of a doctrine of appearances in
modem jurisprudence?
The actions of public officials send important messages
about the values that govern the relationship between the
government and the governed. In Shaw v. Reno the Supreme
Court recognized this when it refused to sanction a
reapportionment plan which grouped sections of the
electorate on the basis of race.25 2 The plan was objectionable
because it sent the message that race was an acceptable basis
of classification.2 53 In Crawford v. Marion County Board of
Elections the Court's decision upholding a requirement of
voter ID irrespective of evidence that such requirements
actually prevented voter fraud showed its understanding of
the importance that appearances can play in the popular
perception of what constitutes procedural fairness.2 54 The
reason that the outcry that followed the refusals to recuse of
Judge Benjamin, and before him Justice Scalia, was not
confined to "partisan communities," as the judge asserted, is
largely because the messages that they sent to the general
public offended precisely that "common sense" or popular
understanding of "fairness" which, when invoked to justify
retaining jury verdicts, is hailed as illuminating "the lamp
that shows that freedom lives."255 However, this is something
that judges asked to recuse themselves have struggled to
256
recognize.
251. See Trust in Doctors 2009, IPSOS (Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.ipsos-
mori.com/researchpublications/publications/publication.aspx?oltemld=1305
(survey on trust in the professions finding that judges' ratings for telling the
truth have fallen below 70% on only one occasion since 1983); cf Trust in Our
Community, READER'S DIGEST http://www.rdglobaladvertising.com/trusted-
brands/results/tables/community.shtml (last visited Sept. 29, 2010) (a Reader's
Digest survey of trusted brands covering 16 European countries (including the
U.K.) found that levels of confidence in all professions had declined since 2005
and between 2007-2009 trust in judges was down about 3%. The survey put the
level of trust in U.K judges at around 10% lower than the Ipsos Mori findings
but this may reflect differences in the formulation of questions and
categorization of responses).
252. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657-58 (1993).
253. Id. at 647-48.
254. Crawford v. Marion County Bd. of Elections, 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1620
(2008).
255. SIR PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 164 (1956).
256. See Editorial, supra note 210.
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CONCLUSION
In the introduction to this paper we referred to the
doctrine of appearances as a creation of an invented tradition,
but reinvention or reformulation might be a more appropriate
term. Professor Robert M. Cover has observed that:
We inhabit a nomos-a normative universe. * We
constantly create and maintain a world of right and
wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and void.. . . No
set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from
the narratives that locate it and give it meaning.25 7
The point about a narrative of tradition is that it both
shapes and limits our thinking and in so doing generates a
legitimizing force. Lawyers need authority, and the ability to
position that authority within a historical narrative is an
important aspect of the way in which they can use tradition
as the basis of successful legal argument. Tradition indicates
"quality and endurance" but it is commonplace that the form
may outlive the substance or even, as Hobsbawm reminds us
in the passage that we cited earlier, impose itself de novo in a
way that bears little resemblance to the historical fact upon
which it claims to draw.258 Ultimately, however, appeals to
tradition are about continuity and change; they offer a way of
thinking about the concerns of the past in relation to the
needs of the present and in so doing provide a framework of
parameters within which change can take place. 2 59
In the Privy Council decision of Lawal, Lord Steyn
commented that "[wihat the public was content to accept
many years ago is not necessarily acceptable in the world of
today. The indispensable requirement of public confidence in
the administration of justice requires higher standards than
was the case even a decade or two ago."2 0 Higher standards
or different standards? We suggest that the modern
sensitivity to the importance of appearances represents more
than a loss of innocence concerning the limits of neutrality. It
represents an acknowledgement of the importance now
generally accorded to attempts to explain the relationship
between government and the governed in terms of a
257. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983).
258. Hobsbawm, supra, note 13, at 1.
259. See generally H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD:
SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW 1-13 (2007).
260. Lawal v. Northern Spirit, [2003] UKHL 35, [20031 I.C.R. 856, 865.
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commitment of respect for the value of individual human
dignity and equality. From the perspective of Western
political history these commitments are relatively new, hence
the importance of formulations emphasizing the continuity of
a tradition within which what are, in effect, new rights and
new doctrines can claim to be born and now find legal
expression. Seen in these terms, the emergence of ajurisprudence of appearances represents not so much the
invention of a new tradition, as we initially suggested, but
rather a reformulation, an attempt to refashion the
jurisprudence of the past as common law method has always
permitted in such a way as to respond to and reach
accommodation with the needs of the present.
In conclusion we are reminded of the words of Sir Jack
Jacob which we think sum up our current theme:
Let no one underestimate the deep and abiding sense of
justice which permeates and inspires the ordinary people
of the land. In all countries, in all cultures, in all ages,
men have striven to find the pathway to justice on the
basis of their own social order, and it must not be thought
that we in our time have reached the end of the road. The
search for justice, as the social ideal which mankind
should seek to obtain, remains as elusive and
controversial as it has ever been . . . .262
261. See generally MASHAW, supra note 188, at 158-221, 162, 169 (arguing
that the attraction of a dignitary theory of due process which emphasizes
"values inherent in or intrinsic to our common humanity" is not merely a matter
of intuitive appeal but enables both "a conversation about public values that is
both relevant to our real concerns and consistent with our constitutional
traditions" and "a theoretical and historical grounding for the articulation of
due process values, and a methodology of adjudication that can address the
crucial issues of legitimacy in the administrative state.").
262. JACOB, supra note 216, at 2.
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